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Statehood and Refugees: Patterns of Integration and Segregation of 
Refugee Populations in Lebanon from a Comparative Perspective 
 
Abstract: Scholarly debate has persuasively highlighted the inherent tension between 
refugees and the modern state. Yet, how do state-refugee relations unfold in practice 
when considering the historical and social specificity of a single state? Is there a 
heuristic value in going beyond the premises of a general state-refugee binary and adopt 
a state-specific approach? These questions are addressed through an analysis based on 
the modelling of statehood in Lebanon and comparing five cases of refugee-state 
relations in this country. This method allows explaining the variation in degrees of 
segregation or integration of refugees and shows that the mode of politicization of 
refugees is the key factor in understanding this variation. Not all refugees and not all 
states are the same; the variance of state-refugee relations is best explained from a 
perspective that considers the historically situated nature of statehood. 
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Introduction1 
The scholarly debate on refugees has constantly highlighted a seemingly unsolvable 
tension between modern states and refugee populations. Hannah Arendt has observed 
how being a refugee entails exclusion from the political community depriving persons 
of “the right to have rights.”2 Giorgio Agamben has pointed out that refugees are the 
living proof of the fiction of sovereignty and confute the equation of nativity and 
nationality as the foundation of the modern nation-state.3 Heather Rae has shown how 
the formation of modern nation-states relies on processes of “pathological 
homogenisation” of the political community which generates refugees and 
statelessness.4 Emma Haddad has claimed that the formation of an international society 
of nation states has produced the conditions of existence of refugees as populations 
stranded “between sovereigns”.5 
This study further explores the refugee-state relation to add complexity to the 
idea that state and refugees are entities inherently difficult to reconcile. I argue that, 
differently from simple dichotomy that contrasts the modern state with the refugee, an 
analytical perspective which focuses on the social and historical character of statehood 
explains more exhaustively the dynamics of integration or segregation that refugees 
                                                 
1 The author is grateful to the convenors and participants of the workshop organised by the Citizenship 
Standing Group at the ECPR Joint Sessions held at the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna in 2016, for 
providing helpful feedback on a previous version of this paper.  
The feedback of the two anonymous reviewers of this journal has also been useful and constructive. 
The research presented in this paper was funded through the Early Career Fellowship Grant awarded 
by The Leverhulme Trust. 
2 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 1st ed.(New York,: Harcourt, 1951), 208. 
3 Giorgio Agamben, Means without End: Notes on Politics, Theory out of Bounds (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2000). 
4 Heather Rae, State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples, Cambridge Studies in International 
Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
5 Emma Haddad, The Refugee in International Society: Between Sovereigns, Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
experience in host states. Whereas state-refugee relations are always complex, an 
analytical perspective on statehood enables understanding of the diversification of these 
relations from case to case. 
Instead of proposing inter-state comparisons6 or comparison between different 
refugee regimes;7  the following analysis juxtaposes refugee populations within the 
social and historical contingency of one state, and aims to deepen our understanding of 
what causes the segregation or inclusion of refugees. 
Migration studies literature has previously researched the processes of migrants’ 
integration or segregation relying on ‘national modelling’ methods to explain the 
diverse policies and outcomes of these processes, especially in the western world.8 This 
study contributes to this approach, but differs in its focus on statehood9  − instead of 
nationality − and in the consideration of the specific case of Lebanon and its refugee 
populations. 
The essay begins by identifying three aspects characterising Lebanese statehood: 
confessional politics, uncertain geopolitical identity, and exclusive political community. 
Then, a structured comparison of the politicisation, religious identity, and socio-
                                                 
6 Alexander Betts, Survival Migration: Failed Governance and the Crisis of Displacement (Ithaca, New 
York: Cornell University Press, 2013); Antigone Lyberaki et al., "Migrants' Strategies and Migration 
Policies: Towards a Comparative Picture," Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 6, no. 3 (2008); 
Gil Loescher and Laila Monahan, eds., Refugees and International Relations,  (Oxford, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989). 
7 Phil Orchard, A Right to Flee: Refugees, States, and the Construction of International Cooperation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Rae, State Identities. 
8 Christian Joppke, "Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western 
Europe," West European Politics 30, no. 1 (2007); Remus Gabriel Anghel, "On Successfulness: How 
National Models of Integration Policies Shape Migrants’ Incorporation," Journal of Immigrant & 
Refugee Studies 10, no. 3 (2012); Veit Bader, "The Governance of Islam in Europe: The Perils of 
Modelling," Journal of Ethnic & Migration Studies 33, no. 6 (2007). 
9 Statehood is conceptualized, herein, as the articulation of the state-citizen relation shaping the 
bureaucratic, legal, social, and political context within which forced migrants set up their space and 
modes of survival. 
economic status of the Armenian, Kurd, Palestinian, Iraqi, and Syrian refugees in 
Lebanon follows.  
Admittedly, a five case studies analysis allows only for a macroscopic approach 
to each of these; this is an acknowledged limitation of this study which does not have 
the ambition of providing a detailed account for each. Yet, this macroscopic 
comparative approach has the benefit of showing that state-refugee relations vary 
significantly from case to case from a degree of relative integration to outright 
segregation. This aspect is different from the blanket incompatibility between modern 
statehood and refugees that much of the scholarly debate has exposed, because it shows 
that this incompatibility can vary and sometimes be renegotiated if we consider the 
social and historical nature of statehood.  
Whereas Arendt, Agamben, and others are right in advancing an 
“incompatibility thesis” highlighting that the modern state can hardly be receptive 
towards refugees and is, in fact, a cause of their existence; it is against the background 
of Lebanon’s socio-political fragmentation, its geopolitical uncertainty, and its 
exclusive political community, that we can explain how state and refugee populations 
have attempted to manage this relationship, sometimes achieving coexistence, 
sometimes corroborating the incompatibility thesis. 
With reference to the cases under analysis, we notice that integration or partial 
integration occur when refugees’ politicisation is adaptive. Conversely, segregation, 
expulsion, and sometimes the attempt to physically eliminate refugees, have recurred 
when their politicisation has been highly contentious. Perhaps surprisingly for a 
confessional state as Lebanon, religious identity only matters for integration as long as 
is used as an instrument to be co-opted by the political clientele of the Lebanese system, 
in conjunction with adaptive politicisation.10 As regards socio-economic status, the 
cases under analysis show that higher degrees of education and wealth often lead to 
better integration, but some poor and extremely poor refugees could find ways to 
integrate within the Lebanese context.  
Thus, the study reaches two main conclusions. First − from a methodological 
perspective − the analysis of statehood has heuristic value in explaining refugee-state 
relations; profiling the specific character of statehood allows revisiting state-refugee 
relations and go beyond the crude binary of modern statehood versus refugees. 
Secondly, the case of Lebanon shows that politicisation is a crucial determinant of the 
dynamics of assimilation or segregation; religious identity and socio-economic status 
play an influential role but – differently from politicisation − they are not necessary 
conditions for integration or a sufficient cause for segregation. 
[TABLE 1] 
Lebanese Statehood: Confessionalism, Geopolitical Uncertainty, and 
Exclusive Political Community 
An exhaustive account of Lebanese statehood exceeds the scope of this study,11 but for 
                                                 
10 The concept of politicisation is hereby understood as a process of transition from humanitarian subject 
as “refugee” (mainly a recipient of aid characterised by “needs”) to a political agent who engages with 
the political dynamics of the host country. This concept may be interpreted as related to the idea of 
“citizenship activism” as theorised by Isin. Engin F. Isin, "Theorizing Acts of Citizenship," in Acts of 
Citizenship, ed. Greg Marc Nielsen, (London ; New York: Zed Books Ltd., 2008). Yet the complexity 
of this conceptualisation prevents us from elaborate further on this subject, and instead we opt for the 
more general politicisation instead of “citizenship activism”. 
11 See for thorough accounts Michael C. Hudson, The Precarious Republic: Political Modernization in 
Lebanon (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); Kamal S. Salibi, A House of Many Mansions: 
The History of Lebanon Reconsidered (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Albert 
Hourani, Syria and Lebanon; a Political Essay (Beirut,: Lebanon Bookshop, 1968); Theodor Hanf, 
Coexistence in Wartime Lebanon: Decline of a State and Rise of a Nation (London: Centre for 
Lebanese Studies in association with I.B. Tauris, 1993); Elizabeth Picard, Lebanon, a Shattered 
Country: Myths and Realites of the Wars in Lebanon (New York, N.Y.: New York, N.Y.: Holmes 
& Meier, 1996); Reinoud Leenders, Spoils of Truce: Corruption and State-Building in Postwar 
Lebanon (Ithaca: Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012); U. Makdisi, "Reconstructing the Nation-
State: The Modernity of Sectarianism in Lebanon," Middle East Report, no. 200 (1996); Samir 
Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987); Samir Khalaf, Civil 
the purpose of this analysis it shall be sufficient to show why confessionalism, political 
exclusiveness, and geopolitical uncertainty are crucial aspects defining Lebanese 
statehood. This becomes most apparent through an overview of the process of formation 
of the Lebanese state. 
Confessional Politics 
In 1861, the Christian Maronite community living in the area of Mount Lebanon was 
capable − with the support of France − of establishing the Mutasarrifate, which 
constituted the earliest administrative entity at the core of the emergence of Lebanon as 
a state. The Mutasarrifate was given a higher degree of administrative autonomy, 
compared to the Vilajets of Beirut, Damascus, Tripoli and Aleppo, because the 
Christian community had suffered attacks in the second half of the nineteenth century 
from other religious communities, and therefore both the Maronites and their foreign 
patrons thought that a separate political order could provide protection.12 As the 
Maronite Patriarch would have written in 1926, “The original idea that served as a basis 
for the establishment of the Lebanese state was to make it into a refuge for all the 
Christians of the Orient and an abode of undivided fidelity to France.”13 
With the division of the Middle East originating from the San Remo Conference 
of 1920, the mostly Maronite Christian area of Mount Lebanon was expanded to include 
the areas of Beirut, Tripoli, Sidon, Tyre, and the Biqāʾ Valley. This decision to create a 
                                                                                                                                               
and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon: A History of the Internationalization of Communal Contact, The 
History and Society of the Modern Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); 
Nadim Shehadi, The Idea of Lebanon: Economy and State in the CéNacle Libanais 1946-54, ed. 
Centre for Lebanese Studies(Oxford: Centre for Lebanese Studies, 1987); David Hirst, Beware of 
Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East (New York: Nation Books, 2010). 
12  Khalaf, Lebanon's Predicament, 45-72. 
13  Quoted in Rania Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932 Revisited. Who Are the Lebanese?," British 
Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 26, no. 2 (1999): 232. 
‘Grand Liban’ − advocated also by the Maronite community − brought into the borders 
of the new entity a Muslim population almost equivalent in size to the Christian 
population.14  
The expansion from a mainly Maronite state to a ‘Greater Lebanon’ changed the 
confessional composition of the population. The configuration of the Lebanese political 
community further diversified through the inclusion of other religious denominations 
(Sunni, Shia, Druze, Jews and other Christian groups), diverse economic and social 
groups (such as the agricultural south and the commercial cities on the coast) and a 
plethora of kin groups related to family allegiances. The foundations of the state were 
originally based on dominant Christian elite, but its actual social and religious 
composition became more diversified than the original project of ‘Christian Lebanon’ 
had been envisioned.  
In 1926, a constitution laid the foundations of its institutional architecture. It 
formally established the Lebanese Republic, based on a bicameral system under the 
control of the French Mandate regulated by the League of Nations.15  Subsequently, this 
form of state changed from parliamentary to republican model, with the merging of the 
two chambers into a single parliament and the empowerment of the president over the 
executive cabinet.16  
In 1932, a census of Lebanon’s population took place (see below) that would 
become a milestone in the definition of Lebanon’s political community.17 The 
                                                 
14 Thibaut Jaulin, "Citizenship, Migration, and Confessional Democracy in Lebanon," Middle East Law 
and Governance 6, no. 3 (2014): 254; Thibaut Jaulin, "Démographie Et Politique Au Liban Sous Le 
Mandat," Histoire & mesure XXIV, no. 1 (2009). 
15 See Digithèque de matériaux juridiques et politiques, "Constitution Du 23 Mai 1926,"  http://mjp.univ-
perp.fr/constit/lb1926i.htm. 
16 Bahige Tabbarah, "The Lebanese Constitution," Arab Law Quarterly 12, no. 2 (1997). 
17 Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932." 
independent state of 1943 slightly amended the 1926 republican constitution; but what 
most significantly influenced independent Lebanon was the power-sharing agreement 
that followed among the main confessional groups. With the departure of the French 
administration, it was necessary to devise a mechanism to control Lebanon’s internal 
fragmentation between religious groups, especially the Maronite Christians and the 
Sunni Muslims.18  
Thus, the National Pact (al-Mithāq al-Waṭani) emerged superimposing over the 
formal constitution a sectarian distribution of offices between Christians and Muslims in 
government, parliament,19 and in the rest of the state bureaucracy. Christians − with 
control of the presidential office and the majority of seats in the parliament − retained a 
prevalent share of power in the state. The Sunni groups were given control of the office 
of the prime minister, whereas the Shiʿi community was given the chair of the 
parliament. The pact also established that Lebanon’s geopolitical role would be 
balanced between independence from the West and autonomy from regional dynamics 
as pan-Arabism and the Cold War.20  
For about a decade, independent Lebanon managed to become a relatively 
functional political system with a remarkable economic record, but the divisions within 
its society rendered it intrinsically fragile. The confessional system was not sufficient to 
guarantee stability and governance for the country because it entrenched its divisions 
instead of resolving them. Already in 1958 both domestic and regional dynamics put the 
political system under pressure, which was on the verge of erupting into civil war.21 
                                                 
18 Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, 184-85. 
19 The parliament was already split between Christian and Muslims as a transitional clause of the 1927 
Constitution. See Tabbarah, "Lebanese Constitution." 
20 Hudson, The Precarious Republic, 43-45; Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, 186-89. 
21 Fawaz Gerges, "Lebanon," in The Cold War and the Middle East, ed. Avi Shlaim and Yazid Sayigh, 
(Oxford: Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 77-101. 
Subsequently, fragmentation and sectarian antagonisms were exacerbated by regional 
conflicts and domestic tensions,22 and in 1975, Lebanon precipitated in a civil war that 
lasted until 1989. 
Notwithstanding a nominal commitment to abolish it, also after the civil war, 
confessionalism survived as the chief principle of political and social (dis)order in the 
country, although it was slightly revised to roughly equalise powers between Christians 
and Muslims (in particular, the Sunni groups). The contexts of war, instability, and the 
interests of political groups in preserving the status quo have precluded the possibility 
of abolishing the sectarian system.23 
The Lebanese confessional system, therefore, remains a crucial component of 
Lebanese statehood to which all refugee populations migrating to Lebanon inevitably 
had to relate when fleeing to Lebanon. 
Geopolitical Uncertainty 
A second key aspect defining Lebanese statehood is its geopolitical ambivalence, which 
has had the effect of exposing this state to external dynamics of conflict. 
Originally, Lebanon was ‘carved out’ of a broader project attempting to 
establish a ‘greater Syria’ (Bilād al-Shām), which eventually failed to materialize. This 
has generated regional and domestic tensions that have never been fully resolved. At the 
root of this problem is uncertainty within Lebanon about where Lebanon stands in the 
geopolitical map of the region. 
                                                 
22 Hudson, The Precarious Republic. 
23 Tom Najem, Lebanon: The Politics of a Penetrated Society, The Contemporary Middle East (London ; 
New York: Routledge, 2012), 64-82; Are J. Knudsen and Michael Kerr, eds., Lebanon: After the 
Cedar Revolution; Janine A. Clark and Bassel F. Salloukh, "Elite Strategies, Civil Society, and 
Sectarian Identities in Postwar Lebanon," International Journal of Middle East Studies 45, no. 4 
(2013). 
Christian political elites have more often endorsed Lebanese nationalism, 
supporting the idea of Lebanon as an autonomous entity from the Arab world, oriented 
towards friendly relations with the western political sphere.  In contrast, Lebanese pan-
Arabists (more commonly part of the Sunni political groups), have seen the Lebanese 
political identity as deeply connected with the Arab world. In the most radical cases, 
these groups even consider Lebanon an organic component of Syria, thus rejecting the 
partition subsequent to the Sykes-Picot Agreement. These divisions have been 
exacerbated also by the fact that they partly overlap with confessional differences.24  
Since the decline of pan-Arabism and the end of the Cold War, the antagonism 
between pan-Arab nationalists and Lebanese nationalists has gradually been replaced by 
alignment with the two main regional axes of alliances in the region. On one hand, the 
rise of Sunni political groups in post-War Lebanon in alliance with some of the 
Christian parties has been supported by the conservative monarchies, led by Saudi 
Arabia in conjunction with western protection. On the other hand, groups such as 
Hezbollah and its Christian allies have benefited from the protection of the coalition 
between Syria and Iran, under the influence of Russia. 
These clashing views on Lebanon’s international role have had the effect of 
making this country a catalyst for regional and global tensions, whereby international 
actors have been able to recruit sympathisers or to form para-military groups to project 
their influence in a fragmented institutional and social context. Lebanon has been a 
battleground for most of the main conflicts of the Middle East. It was exposed to and 
directly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict.25 Since the Iranian revolution, it has been 
                                                 
24 Salibi, A House of Many Mansions, 169-74. 
25 Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries: A People's History, Middle East 
Series No 3 (London: Zed Press, 1979); Rex Brynen, "PLO Policy in Lebanon: Legacies and 
Lessons," Journal of Palestine Studies 18, no. 2 (1989). 
entangled in the regional antagonism between the Islamic Republic of Iran and its 
enemies.26 Overall, the fifteen year long civil war was characterised by the interplay of 
local dynamics, regional conflicts, and the Cold War.  
The result of this ambivalence is a state characterised by an unresolved 
geopolitical uncertainty. The refugee populations hosted in Lebanon were often pushed 
into this country by the very conflicts which have been affecting Lebanon’s statehood; 
to different degrees, refugee populations have been recruited in these struggles or 
engulfed into their unmerciful mechanics. 
Exclusive Political Community 
The third aspect of Lebanese statehood relates to how membership to its citizenship has 
been regulated. Citizenship, by definition, constitutes an exclusive political community 
but in the Lebanese case exclusiveness is particularly strict. Lebanese nationality law 
applies as main criterion of membership patrilineal ius sanguinis.27 This standard is the 
result of a historical process in which political elites have tried to shape Lebanese 
citizenship to preserve confessional and sectarian proportions, while the country was 
undergoing demographic changes due to emigration and immigration flows, including 
the arrival of refugee populations. 
The origins of a legal regulation of citizenship in Lebanon date to the 1869 
Ottoman reform of citizenship.28 The innovation was that the new Ottoman law 
                                                 
26 H. E. Chehabi and Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 Years 
(Oxford; London; New York: Centre for Lebanese Studies; In association with I.B. Tauris, 2006). 
27 There are few very rare exceptions in which ius soli can be applied for example for some orphans 
Association Frontiers Ruwad, Invisible Citizens: Humiliation and a Life in the Shadows: A Legal and 
Policy Study on Statelessness in Lebanon: English Version 2011 (Beirut, Lebanon: Frontiers Ruwad 
Association, 2011), 58. A foreigner woman can also opt for Lebanese citizenship by marrying a 
Lebanese man. Another way to acquire citizenship is by presidential decree, see the discussion below. 
28 Gianluca Paolo Parolin, Citizenship in the Arab World: Kin, Religion and Nation-State, Imiscoe 
Research (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009), 73-74. 
acknowledged citizenship not on the basis of religious affiliation, but on ius sanguinis 
complemented by ius soli. The ius soli principle included habitual residence within the 
region of Ottoman jurisdiction. In 1923, the Treaty of Lausanne regulated the rules for 
the acquisition of citizenship in the countries that emerged from the dissolution of the 
Ottoman Empire. The French High Commissioner issued a decision (arrêté n. 2825) 
which declared all former Ottomans habitually29 resident in Lebanon on 30 August 
1924 Lebanese citizens. Other articles of the same law established that persons of 
Lebanese origin not present on Lebanese soil could opt for Lebanese citizenship by 
virtue of the ‘right of option’ within two years.30 The possibility of opting for Lebanese 
citizenship was extended for decades.31 This exceptional extension of the right of option 
benefited the Christian population of Lebanon, which was the most affected by the 
emigration process.32  
As explained by Thibaut Jaulin,33 Lebanon, at this time was perceived as an 
‘emigration country’. Yet, at a later stage, it also became a country of immigration, as 
refugee populations began to flee there. Within this context, the principle of ius 
sanguinis gained prominence over ius soli in regulating nationality in Lebanon.34 This is 
because ius sanguinis (i.e. the rule that nationality is acquired by direct family lineage) 
reserved the status of citizen to descendants of Lebanese only, and − in the interest of 
                                                 
29 The key word ‘habitually’ was particularly ambiguous and its application has been the subject of much 
dispute, see for example Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932," 226. 
30 Treaty of Lausanne, Art. 31-33. 
31 Frontiers Ruwad, Invisible Citizens, 42. 
32 Jaulin, "Citizenship, Migration, ," 256; Jaulin, "Démographie Et Politique," 198-203. 
33 Thibaut Jaulin, "« C’est Bien La Loi D’un Pays À Forte Émigration » Principes De La Nationalité Et 
Représentations De La Nation Au Liban," Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée 
137(2015). 
34 Ibid., 24-30. 
ruling elites − it artificially preserved confessional and sectarian balances while the 
actual demographics of the country were changing. 
In 1925, a ‘law on Lebanese nationality’35 established that patrilineal ius 
sanguinis was the main principle conferring Lebanese citizenship. Additionally, Article 
3 of the same law stated that foreigners legally resident in the country for more than an 
uninterrupted five years, persons married to a Lebanese woman and resident in Lebanon 
for one year, or those who have given services to the country, could obtain Lebanese 
nationality upon request through a presidential decree.36 But, in 1939, this article was 
abrogated.37 Furthermore, in 1946, a new law was approved, establishing a set of 
parameters causing the loss of Lebanese nationality, especially targeting naturalized 
citizens.38 As a result, the only way to become Lebanese was by having a Lebanese 
father or by marrying39 a Lebanese man or through a decree issued by the President the 
Republic, who according to the Lebanese confessional system is always a Christian. It is 
hardly coincidental that this restriction on naturalisation procedures and the revocation 
of previously granted naturalisations took place at the time in which Lebanon was 
shifting from emigration country to immigration destination, thus corroborating Jaulin’s 
thesis that Lebanon’s nationality law has been influenced by its demographic 
movements.40  
                                                 
35 Arrêté 15/s of 1925. 
36 Ministry of Interior of Lebanon, Qawānīn Lubnān: Majmūʻat Al-Nuṣūṣ Al-Tashrīʻīyah wa-al-
Tanẓīmīyah, ed. Ministry of Interior, vol. 15(Beirut: Dār al-Manshūrāt al-Ḥuqūqīyah, 2001), 7158. 
37 Regulation Nº122 L . R ., dated 19 / 06 / 1939. Whether the abrogation of this law is effective or not is 
disputed due to a set of contradictive provisions and the fact that naturalisation decrees have been 
issued also after the abrogation of article 3, see Frontiers Ruwad, Invisible Citizens, 69-70. 
38 Law of 31 January 1946. 
39 Consider that in Lebanese law marriage is regulated by Personal Status Law which is under the 
authority of religious institutions, therefore marriage can only be stipulated between persons of the 
same religious sect. 
40 Jaulin, "« C’est Bien La Loi D’un Pays À Forte Émigration »," 27-29. 
In addition to nationality legislation, a process of demographic engineering took 
place with regard to the census of the population within the Lebanese territory of 
1932.41  According to Maktabi, this survey of the population was designed to favour the 
interests of the Christian community.42 Furthermore, Jaulin has illustrated how the 
intricate legal debate on the inclusion of the Lebanese living abroad into the Lebanese 
census is part of a “fabrication of demographic statistics” reflecting political interests.43 
It was on the basis of this controversial census that the power distribution among 
different sects became a norm with the National Pact of 1946, and attributed to the 
Christians (especially the Maronite) the biggest power share. Notwithstanding the 
census, the actual proportions of religious groups in Lebanon are today the subject of 
dispute.44  
Extraordinarily, naturalisation also took place in 1994, when the government of 
the Sunni leader Rafīq al-Ḥarīri issued a decree which naturalised 150,000 individuals, 
two thirds of them Muslims and probably about half of them Sunni.45  This 
naturalisation decree proved controversial and created a legal and political stalemate 
thus far unresolved.46 As a result, the status of those naturalized through this decree has 
                                                 
41 A previous census took place in 1921. 
42 Maktabi, "The Lebanese Census of 1932," 233-38. 
43 Jaulin, "Démographie Et Politique," 208. 
44 Muhammad A. Faour, "Religion, Demography, and Politics in Lebanon," Middle Eastern Studies 43, 
no. 6 (2007). 
45 According to many this naturalisation had important electoral repercussions in favour of Syrian 
influence in Lebanon see Guita G. Hourani and Eugene Sensenig-Dabbous, "Naturalized Citizens: 
Political Participation, Voting Behavior, and Impact on Elections in Lebanon (1996-2007)," 
Journal of International Migration and Integration 13, no. 2 (2012): 189; 96-200; Jaulin, 
"Citizenship, Migration, ," 265. 
46 Melkar el-Khoury and Thibaut Jaulin, "Eudo Citizenship Observatory Country Report: Lebanon," in 
EUDO Citizenship Observatory(Florence/Edinburgh: Roberty Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies 
and Edinburgh University Law School, 2012), 11-12. 
remained ambivalent.47 In this respect, Jaulin has noticed how “the discretionary power 
of the executive over the naturalisation has contributed to changing the Lebanese 
citizenship into a resource to be distributed by political leaders. Naturalisation has, thus, 
been a key instrument for the development of political clienteles.”48  
The result of this exclusive form of citizenship is that tens of thousands of 
autochthonous individuals are currently stateless in Lebanon.49 For example, some of 
the population in the north and south of Lebanon boycotted a census held in 1921, 
therefore could not formally prove that they were living in Lebanon in 1924 and were 
registered as ‘foreigners’ instead of citizens.50 Lebanon also has a Bedouin population, 
mostly made up of people not registered as citizens thus remaining stateless at the 
present time.51 
Although reliable figures are not available, the persons affected by partial forms 
of citizenship in Lebanon52 or statelessness are in the order of the tens of thousands. In a 
conversation with a Lebanese lawyer specialising in the subject, the author was told that 
the estimated number of individuals who are stateless or whose citizenship status is 
undecided is in the region of 60,000 to 80,000. Another indicator is that the 
                                                 
47 Guita G. Hourani, "Lebanon Starts Revoking Citizenship from Those Who Had Irregularly Acquired It 
in 1994," European University Institute, http://eudo-citizenship.eu/news/citizenship-news/529-
lebanon-starts-revoking-citizenship-from-those-who-had-irregularly-acquired-it-in-1994. 
48 Jaulin, "Citizenship, Migration, ," 261. 
49 Frontiers Ruwad, Invisible Citizens. 
50 Furthermore The so-called ‘Palestinian seven villages’ in south Lebanon, and the area of Wadi Khāled 
in the north-east, are cases in which autochthonous populations have been excluded from enjoying 
full citizenship. el-Khoury and Jaulin, "Country Report: Lebanon," 7; Maktabi, "The Lebanese 
Census of 1932," 228. 
51 D. Chatty, "Bedouin in Lebanon: The Transformation of a Way of Life or an Attitude?," International 
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naturalisation decree of 1994, which had among its objectives normalizing the status of 
some denizens, naturalized more than 150,000 individuals.53 
The political community of Lebanon has created a particularly exclusive group 
which Maktabi defines as a “membership organisation”.54 It developed throughout a 
contradictive process, shaped by the confessional dynamics of the Lebanese system. 
According to Maktabi, citizenship in Lebanon “enable[s] the regime to dominate in 
compliance with its overall objective: the maintenance of its rule in accordance with its 
implicitly and explicitly expressed state-idea.”55 Jaulin has highlighted how the debate 
between Antoun Saade and Michel Chiha epitomises the difference in views on 
Lebanese national identity. Chiha’s Lebanese nationalism prevailed over Saade’s 
Pansyrianism, purporting Lebanon as a country of emigrants but not a country of 
destination for immigration. It is for this reason that nationality law and naturalisation 
procedures “have become an instrument of the struggle for the allocation of power 
within the structure of the confessional system and for the domination of political 
elites.’56  
The latest development on this issue -further highlighting the concern of certain 
Lebanese sectors of preserving sectarian balances within Lebanese citizenry- regards 
the procedures of birth registration of Syrian refugees arriving since 2011. 
Notwithstanding the fact that birth registration of refugee babies does not confer 
Lebanese citizenship, especially the Christian political leadership has opposed to the 
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issuing of birth certificate of Syrian new-borns57 thus increasingly dramatically the 
possibility that these children will become stateless. 
Thus, all refugee populations of Lebanon have to relate to a political community 
based on particularly exclusive principles that look with concern to phenomena of 
immigration as potentially unsettling confessional demographic balances. As we shall 
see, some of these groups have succeeded in progressively integrating with local 
society, whereas others pay a high price of exclusion even after decades of exile in 
Lebanon. 
Five Cases of Refugee Peoples in Lebanon 
It is within the social and historical context of a form of statehood characterised 
by confessionalism, geopolitical uncertainty, and exclusive citizenship that several 
refugee populations were forced to migrate to Lebanon. It should also be mentioned that 
Lebanon is not a part of the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and has always 
declined to become a resettlement country for refugees. No comprehensive and 
effective legal framework is in place to regulate the status of asylum seekers but its 
borders have generally remained open to several refugee movements.58 
Below we consider five cases from a macroscopic perspective, focusing on religious 
identity, politicisation, and socio-economic status. Each of these cases produced a 
different outcome of integration in Lebanese politics and society. 
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The Armenian Case: Integration 
According to official Armenian sources, the Armenian population in Lebanon 
numbered up to 250,000 in the 1970s, and then dropped to 150,000 after the civil war.59 
Most Armenians enjoy full citizenship and a decent (sometimes high) social and 
economic status in Lebanon. They have direct political representation both in 
parliament and government thus, relatively to other refugee populations, they have 
become more integrated within the Lebanese state and society, although they maintain a 
distinguished identity. 
By 1925, in Lebanon there were about 40,000 Armenians, their presence due to 
the persecutions that they had faced in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey since the early 
19th century.60 The treaty of Lausanne was not clear with regard to the possibility of 
them acquiring citizenship but, in 1924, the French Mandate administration endowed 
Lebanese citizenship to all the Armenians who wished to opt for it. At this stage in 
Lebanese history, the Armenian Christian identity fitted well with the interests of 
France and its Maronite protégées, and this facilitated their integration into the 
Lebanese political community as citizens.61  
The Armenian political strategy has been characterised, overall, by neutralism 
and pragmatism. Migliorino defines it “a moderate conservatism vis-à-vis the 
preservation of the consociational system and support for the forces in government.”62 
Armenians have never formed a unified political front; instead their influence was 
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distributed across the political spectrum in the form of different political parties from 
right wing conservatives to leftist communist groups. Even during the civil war, they 
resisted the pressures of joining fighting factions − although they have been 
occasionally target by belligerent groups – and they maintained a stance defined as 
“positive neutrality”.63 Armenian violent activity was instead mostly directed against 
Turkish symbols as part of a transnational struggle, but the impact of this activity on 
Lebanon remained moderate.64  
In post-Ṭāʾif Lebanon (1989), the Armenian groups carved out their political 
role in the consociational system, maintaining unchanged representation in parliament 
and in the government as part of the Christian power-share. This notwithstanding, they 
suffered a decline in political representation due to demographic decrease, lack of 
participation in elections, and because of the attempts at marginalisation of the 
Armenian political groups by other contenders, especially the Sunni group al-
Mustaqbal.65 It is at this point, according to Geukijan66 that Armenian politics has 
become less neutral compared to the past. Yet, notwithstanding these changed 
conditions, Armenian political representation has survived until the time of writing, 
constituting an exceptional case of political adaptation compared to other refugee 
populations of Lebanon. 
Social and economic integration has also been successful. Notwithstanding the 
initial situation in the refugee camps of the 1920s, characterised by extreme poverty and 
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the levelling of social classes due to the persecution in Turkey,67 they have become an 
influential niche of the Lebanese middle class, with control over important sectors of 
local production.68 Similarly, their social embedment has been proven by social and 
civil activities that are testified by the presence of Armenian schools, media and 
associations, which have preserved the identity and social role of the Armenian 
community until today.69  
Having acquired full citizenship, enjoying political representation, and being 
active into the economic and social context of Lebanon, Armenians in Lebanon 
represent the most successful case of refugee population integration into the Lebanese 
state. 
The Kurdish Case: Partial Integration 
 Demographic information on the Kurdish70 presence in Lebanon is scarce. Some 
records report a Kurdish presence of up to 200,000 before the Lebanese civil war, which 
dropped dramatically to a few thousand afterward.71 The UNHCR, in 2008, put the 
figure at 25,000,72 but the conflict in Syria has produced further displacement of Kurds 
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to Lebanon, which has reportedly increased the population significantly.73 The Kurdish 
population has not been integrated in Lebanon as fully as the Armenians.  
Kurds began to migrate during the Mandate period but their main presence was 
established between 1940 and 1960. At this point in history, the confessional system 
was already institutionalised in the National Pact which rendered their integration more 
difficult.74 The causes of the Kurdish migration to Lebanon are mainly related to 
discrimination and violence against them in Turkey, but also to poverty and the need to 
find better economic opportunities. The second phase of migration, this time mainly 
from Syria, is related to the fact that Kurds were stripped of citizenship in this country 
in the late 1950s and early 1960s and then attempted to find better living conditions in 
Lebanon.75  
The integration of Kurds in Lebanon has also been problematic because of the 
complex development of Lebanese citizenship as discussed above. Whereas for the 
Armenians, French Mandate authorities issued specific legislation to provide them with 
citizenship, the Kurds had to register with the local authorities to opt for Lebanese 
legislation on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne. Some of those Kurds who found 
refuge in Lebanon in the 1920s failed to apply for citizenship and did not register for the 
1932 Census, either because they did not recognise its importance or they thought that 
their presence in Lebanon would have been transitional.76  Many of them, as a 
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consequence, remained without official citizenship and were classified as persons of 
‘unknown nationality’. In 1961, an ID card was issued to some including them in the 
category of ‘unspecified nationality’; eventually in 1962 the status of ‘nationality under 
study’ was introduced.77 As a result of this process, Kurds were left, and many of them 
still are, in a condition of denizenship.  
In the earliest phases of their presence in Lebanon, Kurdish political and 
intellectual activism was related mainly to the assertion of a national Kurdish identity, a 
project that enjoyed the support of the French Mandate administration.78 Overall, Kurds 
had scarce interest in becoming entangled in Lebanese domestic politics. In the 1960s, 
Kurdish groups began to interact more closely with local political institutions. They 
established a number of political groups, including nationalist and leftist parties that 
were characterised by their constant internal divisions and subsequent ineffectiveness in 
achieving their objectives.79 The Kurdish constituency became socialised into the 
clientelist relations of the Lebanese system and established connections with the Druze 
and – later on – the Sunni political elites. This effort was only partly conducive to the 
enhancement of their status. They enjoyed increased access to services and were 
promised full citizenship in the 1960s, but their alliance led only to the ambivalent 
status of ‘nationality under study’.80  
In contrast to the Armenians, the Kurds took a belligerent stance in the Lebanese 
civil war also because they were subject to several violent attacks, especially from the 
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right wing Christian factions. According to Meho, most Kurdish militants joined the 
ranks of the Lebanese Communist Party, the Movement of Independent Nasserites, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) or the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). As part of these factions, they fought against the 
Christian right, but they also opposed the Shiite movement AMAL81 and its Syrian 
patrons in the battle for West Beirut in 1983.82 
In the aftermath of the civil war, many Kurds aligned with the Sunni elite led by 
al-Ḥarīri and his al-Mustaqbal Movement. The most tangible sign of this was the 
formation of a Kurdish-based association (the Future Generation, founded in 1997) that 
has fully embraced the al-Ḥarīri’s movement, even renouncing Kurdish identity. Meho 
reports that more than half of the Kurds in Beirut voted for al-Ḥarīri and allies in 1996 
and in 2000.83 Standing with the Sunni ruling elite could have been a beneficial political 
move for their inclusion, since the Sunni community had greater political leverage in 
post-Ṭāʾif Lebanon. Not by coincidence, the possibility of acquiring full citizen status 
for the Kurds materialised with the decree of naturalisation promulgated by al-Ḥarīri’s 
government in 1994.  According to Hourani and Sensenig-Dabbous, around 32,000 
individuals, whose status was ‘under study’ (the majority of them Kurds), were 
naturalised through this decree.84 Yet this decree provoked reactions in the sectarian 
mind-set of Lebanese statehood, and the Christian Maronite leadership of Lebanon filed 
a claim to the State Consultative Council, which ruled that at least some of the 
naturalisations were illegal. The status of those who benefitted from the decree remains, 
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at time of writing, ambivalent.85 In Lebanon, there is only one party organisation left 
with a distinct Kurdish identity, the Razkari Party, but this party has no representation 
in parliament, in government, and in local administration, thus marking a degree of 
political segregation.86 
In contrast to the Armenian case, Kurdish religious identity (mostly Sunni) has 
not played a significant role in their integration. When the Kurds’ politicisation took 
place, their political identity was mainly socialist and secularist, thus unrelated to the 
domestic confessional structures of Lebanon. Their alliance with the Druze leader 
Kamāl Junblatt was mainly based on the assumption that the Junblatt family was 
considered of Kurdish origin. At a later stage, Kurds’ relations with the Sunni elite of 
al-Mustaqbal turned out to be more relevant, but failed to become a means for full 
integration. 
The social and economic conditions of the Kurds in Lebanon reflect their 
problematic integration. Since the beginning of their presence in Lebanon, Kurds were 
relegated to the poorest areas of the country.87 More recently, according to Meho, 85% 
of the Kurds live on or under the poverty line, and about 60% of them are illiterate. 
These figures indicate a profound and protracted marginalisation from the social and 
economic life of Lebanon.88 Hourani has studied the social mobility of Lebanese Kurds, 
comparing the changes in socio-economic status of a sample of the Kurdish population 
within 15 years, and has concluded that the increased, although partial, political 
integration of the 1990s has had some beneficial effects on the socio-economic 
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conditions, but education has remained a factor of ‘backwardness’ for the Kurdish 
group of Lebanon.89 An overview of associational activity among Kurds in Lebanon 
also highlights a mixed situation. Kawtharani and Meho mention that, of a number of 
the most influential associations that have been set up by Kurdish groups, only few have 
active schooling activity; the majority of them are active in providing basic services 
such as health, but most prominent is their political role either in bridging Lebanese-
Kurdish relations or in preserving Kurdish identity and nationalism.90  
Compared to the Armenian case, Kurdish refugees in Lebanon have not enjoyed 
the same degree of integration into political, socio-economic, and religious life. The 
possibility for the Kurds to obtain full citizenship has been constantly hampered, and 
also today has been only partly achieved; their social and economic condition is 
relatively low and marginalised; and politically they do not enjoy official representation 
at any level. Instead they have relied on groups already in power to obtain at least 
partial political influence. 
The Palestinian Case: Segregation 
Until 2011, the Palestinians were the largest refugee group in Lebanon. At the time of 
writing, about 450,000 Palestinian refugees are registered in Lebanon according to the 
UN Relief and Work Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA). The 
Syrian crisis that began in 2011 has caused the displacement to Lebanon of at least 
50,000 Palestinians in addition to those already there.91  
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Palestinian presence in Lebanon began to be significant after the 1948 Arab-
Israeli war. As a consequence of this conflict and the military operations of Israel in 
Palestinian land, 104,000 Palestinians fled to Lebanon, where they settled mostly in 
camps in which they could access the limited services provided by an ad hoc UN 
agency the UNRWA.92 Subsequently, the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and the Black 
September conflict of 1970 in Jordan generated another flight of Palestinian refugees to 
Lebanon.93  
In international law, Palestinians are recognised as refugees not by virtue of the 
1951 refugee convention, but with reference to the statute of UNRWA. In Lebanon they 
have not been acknowledged refugee status (as it is often the case in Arab countries); 
instead they have been ascribed to the category of “stateless foreigners”. This 
ambivalent legal status is worsened by several restrictions to fundamental rights. For 
instance, Palestinians can legally work only in very few labour-intensive sectors; their 
right to movement is affected by restrictions due to a lack of an official passport and 
visa regulations; their access to services as health and education is restricted, they do 
not have a right to own private property, and Palestinians living in the camps are 
affected by insufficient services, inadequate housing and scarce access to fundamental 
goods, due to overcrowding and limited funding available to UNRWA. In post-Ṭāʾif 
Lebanon, things have not significantly changed for Palestinians. The 1994 naturalisation 
decree did not benefit Palestinians, because those who were naturalised were 
subsequently “denaturalised” by a court judgement.94  
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Palestinians’ politicisation in Lebanon is directly connected to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in its regional as well as Lebanese dynamics.  Their presence in Lebanon, but 
also irresponsible national policies, has exacerbated Lebanon’s geopolitical uncertainty, 
widening the gap between pan-Arabist and leftist nationalist factions and pro-western 
Lebanese nationalist groups. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Palestinian activism 
increased, especially after the 1969 Cairo Agreement, which allowed the Palestinian 
Liberation Organisation (PLO) to operate freely in the camps, and  when groups as the 
PLO and the People’s Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) shifted their 
operations from Jordan to south Lebanon.95  
When the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, and in contrast to the 
Armenian and Kurdish cases, the Palestinian factions were directly involved from its 
inception and are considered among the principal causes of the conflict. In 1982, during 
the second Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Palestinian belligerence was in decline after a 
long and bloody battle against Israeli forces, Lebanese Christian militias as the Kata’eb, 
and the Shiite movement AMAL. The conflict between Palestinians and the Lebanese 
peaked with the massacres of Ṣabrā and Shatīla camps, when more than a thousand 
Palestinians were killed in a few days by Lebanese Christian militias in October 1982.96  
Subsequently, the War of the Camps (1985-1987) broke out between Palestinian armed 
groups and AMAL (with the support of the Syrian regime) which was trying to contain 
the role of Palestinian factions expanding the influence of Lebanese armed groups and 
safeguarding Syrian interests in Lebanon.97  
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With the Ṭāʾif Agreement of 1990, hostilities have subsided, but the 
Palestinians, and in particular their militarised factions, have remained a source of 
tension and sometimes conflict; for example, in 2007 the Lebanese Army besieged and 
then destroyed the Palestinian Camp of Nahr al-Bārid where armed Palestinian groups 
such as Fataḥ al-Islām were operating.98 In 2005, the Lebanese Government established 
the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee, the first attempt to address the 
Palestinian question through an institutionalised process but, thus far, it has failed to 
advance significantly the degree of integration of Palestinians in Lebanon.99  
The contentious political and military role of Palestinian factions in Lebanon has 
been matched by a very poor socio-economic situation. This is epitomised by the fact 
that, differently from all other cases, half of the Palestinians of Lebanon are living in 
camps. Their socio-economic marginalisation has been widely documented and includes 
limits and prohibitions that, as mentioned above, affect their right to work, the right to 
movement and access to basic services such as health, and education among others.100  
Within this context of segregation, notwithstanding the long-term, their social 
and political integration has always been considered a taboo by almost the totality of the 
Lebanese. The very idea of naturalisation (tawṭīn) has never been accepted as a 
possibility.101 The most common opinion is that naturalising Palestinians would deprive 
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them of the right to return to Palestine; less official − although equally corroborated – 
stances include the fact that the sizable Palestinian population (mostly Sunni) would 
unsettle Lebanon’s sectarian balances.102 Aside from Lebanon being part of several 
international or regional treaties acknowledging Palestinian refugee status or special 
status, the most common legal denomination for Palestinians in Lebanon remains that of 
‘foreigner’.103  
Palestinian religious identity has not constituted a factor of integration. 
Somewhat similarly to the case of the Kurds, Palestinian groups were secular and 
therefore never fully resorted to their mainly Sunni identity to facilitate their integration 
into the confessional political system.104  Even when Islamist groups emerged among 
the Palestinians at a later stage, these nevertheless clashed with the Lebanese 
establishment.105  The only case in which religious identity made a difference was in the 
case of Palestinian Christians. Although there is no official statistic, it is commonly 
acknowledged that Palestinian Christians have been granted citizenship via presidential 
decree.106  
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The limited scope of this analysis prevents a more accurate account of 
Palestinian status in Lebanon,107  but the above highlights how the politicisation of the 
Palestinian presence in Lebanon has always been highly contentious. In contrast to the 
adaptive stances of the Armenian groups and the intermediate case of the Kurds, 
Palestinian politicisation has exposed and exacerbated the weaknesses of Lebanese 
statehood, especially as concerns its geopolitical uncertainty. The military activity of the 
Palestinian leadership in Lebanon has subsequently caused the stigmatisation of 
Palestinian refugees as those responsible for Lebanon’s civil war and for its protraction, 
which in turn sanctioned their social marginalisation. 
In contrast to the cases of Kurds and Armenians, Palestinians in Lebanon have 
been segregated. The contentious politicisation of Palestinian groups, as opposed to a 
more neutralist stance, has directly questioned Lebanese statehood. Religious identity 
and a low economic status either pre-empted or were irrelevant in easing Palestinian 
relations with the host state. Nowhere else in the Middle East has the presence of 
Palestinian refugees been as problematic as it has been in Lebanon. 
The Iraqi Case: Informal Accommodation  
The conflicts that have shaken the Middle East since the 2001 war in Afghanistan and 
the 2003 invasion of Iraq have caused a new phase of forced displacement in the region. 
Iraqi refugees in the Middle East reached a peak of about 2.5 to 3 million in 2007.108  
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From 2003, Iraqis began fleeing to Lebanon, often after staying in Syria for a 
short time. Before then, about 10,000 Iraqis were already in Lebanon as a result of the 
persecutions of Saddam Hussein’s regime.109 By 2007, their number had increased to at 
least 50,000 and unofficial estimates count up to 150,000 Iraqis in Lebanon.110  At a 
later stage, the official numbers provided by the government and the UNHCR have 
declined significantly and, in 2013, about 6,000 refugees and asylum seekers were 
reported as registered in Lebanon. However, this figure refers only to regularly 
registered refugees, whereas in all probability there still are thousands of Iraqis in the 
country without legal permits and not accounted for in official statistics.111 
As in the previous cases, the legal status of this group of refugee is difficult to 
determine. The UNHCR in 2003 has drafted a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Lebanese authorities; according to this, those Iraqis that are given refugee status by the 
UNHCR will benefit from a visa to stay in Lebanon for a maximum of 12 months, with 
the hope that this would have been sufficient time to make arrangements for the 
resettlement of refugees. Twelve months were not sufficient to resettle the thousands of 
Iraqi that had arrived in Lebanon since 2003 and the greatest majority of them remained 
in the country without a legal permit. On several occasions, Lebanese authorities have 
granted the possibility to regularise the situation of Iraqis whose visa had expired, but 
the procedure was either too expensive or dependent on conditions such as regular 
employment, and only few could actually acquire a regular status.112  
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This situation has subjected some refugees to detention, minimisation of their 
movement capacity for the fear of being arrested, and even to refoulement. As Trad and 
Frangieh observed, Iraqis have been at risk of becoming ‘Palestinized’113  and several 
reports from human rights organisations have criticised the use of detention measures or 
forced return against Iraqi refugees.114  
As concerns the socio-economic conditions of Iraqi refugees, reports indicate a 
population whose economic and social status is significantly higher than previous cases. 
A 2005 survey shows that about 40% of the refugees were previously employed in Iraq, 
and half of them were in highly skilled positions, with 15% being the owner of small 
enterprises. Furthermore, a significant proportion of refugees owned private property 
and real estate, at least until their departure from Iraq.115 Also, the level of education is 
noticeably higher; almost 10% of the sample surveyed by the Danish Refugee Council 
in 2005 had university level education, and about 50% had received primary and/or 
intermediate education.116 In contrast to the other refugee populations, Iraqis are 
significantly more skilled, educated, and relatively affluent. This is also related to the 
fact that the great majority of these refugees are from Baghdad,117 whereas other 
refugees are often from rural areas, thus having different skills and economic status. 
However, Iraqi forced migration has produced a sharp decline in their economic 
conditions due to the need of ‘buying their access’ to host countries at a high price.  
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The Iraqi presence in Lebanon has kept a very low profile, which has isolated 
the refugees from the tumultuous political dynamics of the host country. Although the 
Iraqi crisis has polarised the entire region, the mass displacement of Iraqis has not had 
significant destabilising effects in Lebanon and Jordan in political terms. Reinoud 
Leenders has observed that on no occasion has the Iraqi refugee crisis represented a 
security issue for host countries, nor have refugees’ grievances played directly into the 
political dynamics of Lebanon or Jordan.118  
The question of religious identity has been particularly influential as to how 
Iraqis have related to Lebanon as host country. Sassoon interestingly has observed that 
− compared to other receiving countries – Lebanon is the only state that has hosted a 
majority of Iraqi Shia refugees (57%) and a significant amount of Christian Iraqis.119 
The sectarian composition of Lebanon may have been one of the reasons Iraqi refugees 
chose this country as a destination. Indeed, a report from the Danish Refugee Council 
has found that “Iraqis living in Lebanon tend to settle and associate according to 
religion.’120 The same is confirmed by Chatty and Mansouri, who observe that the role 
of religious charities and charities related to local political parties has relieved the living 
conditions of Iraqis in Lebanon, thanks to their religious connections in a more 
significant measure than in Jordan and Syria.121 For Iraqis, religious affiliation has 
played a role as a channel for transnational solidarity, facilitating access to aid and 
services and then allowing for a degree of informal integration, at least in temporarily. 
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Even though the Iraqi refugee crisis is a more recent phenomenon than the 
previous cases, its analysis through the prism of Lebanese statehood has, also in this 
case, an explanatory value. The fact that Lebanon does not have a legal framework for 
refugees has rendered the formalisation of Iraqi presence in this country difficult, thus 
causing a degree of segregation of Iraqis from local society. Yet three factors have 
facilitated at least a partial and informal accommodation of Iraqis in Lebanon. Firstly, 
Iraqi presence has been low profile and did not unsettle political balances. As Sassoon 
reports, the absence of major political objections to Iraqi presence in Lebanon and the 
fact that no significant security incidents have taken place indicates that although very 
difficult, the Iraqi situation in this country is not existentially threatening.122 Secondly, 
Iraqi refugees enjoy a social and economic status − in terms of education and economic 
assets − unmatched by other populations, and this has enhanced their capacity to mingle 
with the host community. Finally, religious identity seems to have played a role in 
softening the impact of Iraqi presence in Lebanon. All data available confirms that 
Iraqis in Lebanon take advantage of transnational religious bonds as means of 
integration or at least to access aid, thus, in contrast to the Kurdish and Palestinian case, 
religious identity is a factor contributing to the informal accommodation of this 
population in Lebanon. 
The Syrian Case: An Interim Assessment 
From 2011 onwards, Lebanon has become the receiving country of Syrian refugees 
displaced by the civil war. By early 2015, about 1.3 million Syrians were registered 
with the UNHCR.123 
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As in the Iraqi case, this unprecedented wave of refugees could acquire only an 
ambivalent legal status in the absence of a legal framework for refugee protection. An 
important difference is that Syria-Lebanon relations have been regulated by a Treaty of 
Brotherhood and Cooperation, which includes the free movement of Syrians and 
Lebanese across the border. From 2011 until the end of 2014, Syrians could cross into 
Lebanon freely, also because the government (or the lack thereof) has not taken 
measures on the matter.  
Since 2015, new regulation has been implemented by the government with the 
objective of limiting the flux of Syrians into Lebanon and rendering more difficult − if 
not impossible – the lawful stay of Syrian refugees in the country.124 Those refugees 
who could enjoy sponsorship from Lebanese businesses or had sufficient economic 
capacity, can acquire a permit to stay in Lebanon at least for the length of their 
employment. Yet, the greatest majority of Syrians have remained in Lebanon 
informally, often with expired permits and mostly sheltered in informal settlements 
because the construction of camps has been purposely avoided, so as not to replicate the 
Palestinian experience. The UNHCR has implemented prima facie registration of 
Syrians as refugees, but under domestic legislation, Syrian refugees are not recognised 
as such; instead they are identified as nāziḥin, ‘displaced’, in an attempt to circumvent 
the responsibilities that are recognised to refugees by international law. 
The ambivalent status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has inevitably brought 
about a precarious socio-economic situation. Reports in 2015 observed that 29% of the 
Syrian refugee population cannot fulfil their minimum needs. Furthermore, access to 
health is rendered difficult by the massive influx of population in a country with 
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underdeveloped welfare infrastructures, and 66% of Syrian refugee children cannot 
access education.125  
The question of Syrians’ politicisation is particularly complex. As was explained 
above, Syrian-Lebanese relations are an acrimonious issue at the very core of the 
problematic nature of Lebanese statehood. Therefore, the politicisation of the massive 
Syrian presence in Lebanon risks exacerbating the ambivalence of Lebanon’s 
geopolitical identity. Nevertheless, Syrian refugees in Lebanon have overall been 
perceived as a humanitarian issue thus far, and have remained isolated from domestic 
political antagonisms.  
This notwithstanding, there have been signs of a possible politicisation of 
Syrians in Lebanon. One case, for example, relates to the Syrian refugee population in 
the area of Arsal which, in some instances, has been infiltrated by Syrian Islamist 
militias involved in the civil war. This has caused security concerns, especially among 
the Lebanese political sectors that oppose the Salafist groups of Syria. In August 2014, 
clashes erupted between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and locally based militia. 
Subsequently, the LAF raided the settlement in the area trying to expel bellicose 
presence.126  
Another critical phase, showing how the Syrian refugee population is susceptible 
to contentious politicisation, took place during the electoral consultation of May 2014. 
al-Asad’s regime allowed voting from abroad, and tens of thousands of Syrians flocked 
to the Syrian Embassy in Beirut chanting for al-Asad in a show of support for the Syrian 
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regime.127 The mobilisation caused disruption and raised the concern within Lebanon’s 
political groups that the refugee population was more amenable than expected to 
political mobilisation from external actors. It is perhaps not coincidental that the 
Lebanese government began to implement its restraining policies towards the refugee 
influx soon after these events.  
Empirical research on the politicisation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has 
identified an emerging pattern of increasing neutrality among refugees. This seems to be 
a response to the evolving nature of the conflict in Syria, but also to the increased 
awareness of the risks that Syrians run by becoming pawns of Lebanese and Syrian 
political dynamics.128  
The degree of politicisation of Syrian refugees, and the character of this process 
remains an open question but – consistently with what has been noticed in the previous 
cases − phenomena of politicisation have been concurrent with restrictive measures 
from the government that limit the integration of refugees or, in some cases, even 
sanction their segregation. 
Religious identity is another aspect that cannot be neglected. The overwhelming 
majority of Syrians are Sunni and the magnitude of the crisis may alter the sectarian 
proportions of the Lebanese confessional system. Most political groups claiming to 
represent the Christian Lebanese community interpret this as a risk for the integrity of 
the national identity of Lebanon. It is not a coincidence that Christian political leaders 
have been the most vociferous promoters of the restrictive policies towards Syrian 
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presence and its protraction. Similar to the previous cases, then, religious identity plays 
a role in the prospect of managing Syrian presence in Lebanon in the long term, because 
it impacts on the status quo of its confessional politics. 
Although the Syrian refugee crisis is still unfolding at the time of writing, the 
case features all the characteristics that have been observed for the previous cases. 
Indeed, these previous cases will play an important role in assessing the issues that the 
Syrian refugee presence raises in Lebanon.  
Lebanon has been extraordinarily open and resilient to the flux of Syrian 
refugees, at least until 2015. Religious identity and socio-economic status play a role in 
the reception of this unprecedented phenomenon of forced migration into Lebanon. 
Perhaps most importantly, the possibility of politicisation of Syrian refugee presence 
may cause attrition between refugees and the Lebanese, since this process can become 
politically contentious, and be perceived as a challenge for Lebanese statehood in its 
confessional structures, its geopolitical role and for the presumed integrity of its 
political community.  
Comparative Analysis: Politicisation, Religious Identity, and Socio-Economic 
Status of Refugees in the Context of Lebanese Statehood 
We have proposed a conceptualisation of the Lebanese state as characterised by three 
key elements: confessional politics, geopolitical uncertainty, and exclusive political 
community. Subsequently, we have overviewed how five refugee populations have 
interacted within this context. All cases corroborate the idea of states and refugees being 
political and social actors that are hard to reconcile, for the reasons that have been 
persuasively theorised by Arendt, Agamben, Rae, and Haddad among others. But, in 
addition to this, the variance in degrees of integration or segregation shows that 
different refugee groups establish different relations with their host state. There is a 
degree of complexity in the state-refugee relations that remains unnoticed if we rely on 
a simple dichotomy between modern statehood and refugees and the way this 
complexity manifests depends on how refugees interact with the key components of 
statehood. 
Three main observations on the basis of a comparison of these cases are in place 
here. Firstly, in the medium to long-term, all refugee groups become politicised. From 
mere humanitarian identity as ‘subjects in need’ of refuge, aid, and protection, they 
subsequently shift to a role in which their social and political agency emerges. As a 
consequence, refugees engage in social and political activity to carve out a space of 
inclusion in the host state and increase their entitlement to rights, services, social status, 
and eventually political representation. This process can be understood as what Engin 
Isin considers ‘acts of citizenship’, i.e. “those acts that transform forms (orientations, 
strategies, technologies) and modes (citizens, strangers, outsiders, aliens) of being 
political by bringing into being new actors as activist citizens (claimants of rights and 
responsibilities) through creating new sites and scales of struggle.”129  
Within this process of politicisation, integration or partial integration is more 
common when a refugee population takes either adaptive or neutral stances towards 
Lebanese statehood, whereby the political identity of refugees is embedded in the pre-
existing political structures of the host state. We have seen how the Armenians, in part 
the Kurds, and − to a different extent – the Iraqis have acquired an existential space in 
Lebanese society by avoiding a contentious approach to Lebanese statehood in political 
terms. Instead, they tried to get the most out of the pre-existing socio-political 
conditions such as confessionalism, using these as leverage for inclusion or at least for a 
degree of protection within the Lebanese state.  
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The Palestinian case, conversely, provides counterfactual evidence of the above. 
When politicisation occurs in terms that are highly contentious for Lebanese statehood, 
the harshest form of segregation follows. Palestinian political presence in Lebanon has 
meddled with Lebanese geopolitical uncertainty, exacerbating its already problematic 
internal polarisation. Instead of subscribing to an adaptive political stance, whereby 
Palestinian political groups would have been a function of Lebanese confessional 
politics; Palestinian militants have played into the fractured confessional and political 
structures of the state, provoking a harsh form of segregation by Lebanese political 
elites whose power and existence is entirely dependent on such structures.  
The second observation is that religious identity plays an ambiguous role, which 
can facilitate the co-optation of refugees into sectarian structures but, conversely, can 
increase the perceived risk of unsettling the precarious (im)balances of Lebanon’s 
confessional system.  The fact that Palestinian political groups have been mostly secular 
for a long time has prevented them from using religious identity as an entry point into 
the confessional structures of Lebanon, to take advantage of protection from the Sunni 
elite. Also, when Islamism emerged among Palestinians, the Lebanese Sunni elite 
(which are only minimally involved with Islamism) did not take Palestinians under their 
protection. 
Yet in other cases, when Armenian Christian identity fitted with the project of a 
prevalently Christian Lebanese state or in the case of Christian Palestinians, for 
example, religious identity was a vehicle of integration if matched with adaptive 
politicisation. Consistently, as long as the Kurds were mainly identified with leftist 
secular political actors, they did not enjoy much integration. Only later, when they 
began to be more closely related to the Sunni political elite, were they promised 
enhanced socio-political status.130 Also, in the case of the Iraqi refugees, their mixed 
confessional composition has facilitated their access to local networks. Indeed, the Iraqi 
presence, with its multi-confessional composition, fit within the Lebanese confessional 
complexity instead of constituting a challenging factor. 
The Syrian case is more recent, and unprecedented in its magnitude. The 
parameters of politicisation, religious identity, and socio-economic status warn us that 
politicisation and religious identity risk exposing the Syrian population to increasing 
segregation. It has been highlighted that when signs of politicisation from the Syrians 
occurred, the Lebanese state responded with restrictive measures. This is sign of an 
incipient marginalisation or even segregation of the Syrian population in the long term, 
should politicisation become contentious. Syrian religious identity is also potentially 
unsettling being skewed towards the Sunni Muslim group.131  Thus, the risks of 
exclusion are high and expose the Syrian population to the dangers of a ‘Palestinization’ 
of their condition. If religious identity becomes a further cause of attrition with 
Lebanese statehood, this may further heighten the possibility of their marginalisation.  
The third parameter of the analysis was the socio-economic status of refugee 
populations. In this respect, of the five cases analysed, the Iraqi situation stands out, for 
a relatively high level of education and material wealth. This aspect has rendered their 
relative integration easier by ‘paying their way’ into Lebanon and helping them to 
merge with its middle income society. But the other cases, in which education and 
wealth levels were lower, show that high social and economic standards are not a 
necessary condition for integration. The Armenians or the Kurds, for example, were 
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poor − especially at the beginning – but they nevertheless integrated (to different 
extents) and enhanced their socio-economic status. The Syrian refugee population is 
poor overall, and the costs of residency, visa taxations and the prohibition to work are 
further impoverishing them. Nevertheless, Syrians have a long history of economic 
migration to Lebanon132 which constitutes an important precedent for their possible 
contribution to Lebanese economy. This latter aspect should not be misunderstood, 
however; poverty and low social status inevitably cause isolation from the host society 
and economy in the long term. Instead, what was highlighted herein is that in the early 
phase of migration, the low social and economic status of a refugee population does not 
necessarily constitute an insurmountable problem for progressive integration. 
Conclusions 
It was noted at the outset that the contemporary scholarly debate conceptualises the 
nexus between refugees and moderns statehood as inherently problematic.  
All the cases considered in this study clearly show this tension between 
Lebanese statehood and refugees. Refugee presence is perceived as a challenge to the 
constitutive elements of Lebanese statehood: confessionalism, geopolitical uncertainty, 
and the exclusiveness of the political community. For each of these aspects, refugees 
expose the fragility of Lebanon’s statehood with regard to its confessional (im)balances, 
highlighting its ambivalent regional and international stances, and questioning the 
exclusive nature of citizenship. 
But adopting a perspective that contextualises statehood in its historical 
specificity, and then juxtaposing this conception with the experiences of different 
refugee populations allows us to develop a more thorough understanding of the 
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interaction between refugees and host states. We have seen that the degrees of 
integration and segregation of refugee populations in Lebanon are different, and render 
each experience unique on the basis of how the state-refugee relation unfolds.  
To explain the variance of these cases we cannot rely on a simple dichotomy 
whereby ‘the modern state’ is crudely contrasted with ‘refugees’; instead investigating 
the social and historical specificity of Lebanon’s statehood and the way in which 
refugees have interacted with it has shed light on a more complex reality.133  
Isolating the key components of statehood and then comparing the ways in 
which different refugees have developed survival strategies in this context has allowed 
an explanation of the variations in the way they establish state-refugee relations.  
This methodology has led to the conclusion that those cases in which refugees 
could contribute to the consolidation of the state, or at least remain neutral towards the 
pre-existing conditions of statehood, have resulted in forms of integration or partial 
integration. In these cases, refugees have become parts of Lebanon’s statecrafting.134  
In those cases in which Lebanon’s statehood has been challenged by refugee 
presence -in which “the fiction of sovereignty has been brought to crisis”, in Agamben’s 
words-135 segregation, or even the physical elimination of refugees, has occurred. 
Instead of becoming factors of state consolidation, the contentious politicisation of 
refugees has caused their (mis)perception as threats for the state and its ruling elites. 
Thus, beyond the idea of a basic dichotomy between refugee and modern 
statehood, there is the possibility − or perhaps the need − to develop a more complex 
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understanding of the dynamics of refugee-state relations. The perspective on statehood 
and the subsequent comparison of five cases within the context of Lebanon has been an 
opportunity to sharpen our insight of state-refugee relations, highlighting more complex 
patterns of interaction on the basis of more thorough consideration of the social and 
historical specificity of these relations. 
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